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ABSTRACT 
The Department of the Interior manages offshore oil and gas activities in 
federal waters. While the agency has proposed and/or enacted important 
improvements to the rules that govern some of those activities, it has not 
modernized the regulations that govern offshore oil and gas planning, lease 
sales, or the review and permitting of exploratory drilling. These phases of the 
process are overseen by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), 
and, as was shown in our earlier publication on this topic, are ineffective and 
in need of modernization. In this Article, we argue that fundamental reform 
is necessary and highlight a series of key themes and topics that must be 
addressed to improve the regulatory process and promote better, more 
consistent management outcomes. While the Article draws on examples from 
frontier areas—in particular the U.S. Arctic Ocean—the recommended 
changes would apply to and benefit all areas of the OCS. 
INTRODUCTION 
 In this Article, we build on What About BOEM? The Need to Reform 
the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning and Leasing,1 
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which made the case that the regulations governing offshore oil and gas 
planning and leasing activities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) are 
outdated, ineffective, and in need of revision. The previous Article 
showed that the nature of the offshore oil and gas industry is changing 
and that regulations applicable to Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) obligations have not kept pace with those changes.2 
Here, we take that call for reform one step further by suggesting 
potential improvements to the regulations that govern three of BOEM’s 
substantive obligations: (1) development of five-year OCS oil and gas 
leasing programs; (2) sale of OCS leases to oil and gas companies; and 
(3) review of OCS exploration drilling plans. At these stages of the 
process, BOEM determines where and under what circumstances oil and 
gas companies may be allowed to explore for—and potentially develop 
and produce—hydrocarbons on the OCS. As in our earlier Article, most 
of the justifications presented here focus on frontier areas and, in 
particular, potential oil and gas activities in the U.S. Arctic Ocean. The 
changes we recommend, however, would apply to and benefit all areas 
of the OCS. 
In crafting these recommendations, we highlight recent progress 
and identify the benefits of codifying changes through regulations. We 
do not, however, recommend specific language or address individual 
regulatory provisions that should be revisited. Recognizing that 
fundamental changes need to be made to the regulations, we focus on 
key themes that would improve the regulatory process and foster better 
management outcomes. 
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 1.  Michael LeVine, Andrew Hartsig & Maggie Clements, What About 
BOEM? The Need to Reform the Regulations Governing Offshore Oil and Gas Planning 
and Leasing, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 231, 231–62 (2014).  
2.   Shortly before this Article went to press, DOI issued a rule to restructure 
and reorder many of BOEM’s regulations. See Leasing of Sulfur or Oil and Gas in 
the Outer Continental Shelf, 81 Fed. Reg. 18,111, 18,111–76 (Mar. 30, 2016). The 
rule will add new sections, eliminate unnecessary text, and make other changes 
intended to clarify BOEM regulations. These changes are largely administrative 
in nature, and they do not remedy the substantive shortcomings identified in 
this Article. However, readers should be aware that the citations provided in 
this Article pre-date the new rule, which is scheduled to take effect at the end of 
May, 2016. Id. at 18,112. When the new rule takes effect, the citations to BOEM 
regulations in this Article may not correspond to BOEM’s revised regulatory 
structure. 
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Further, recent decisions to stop certain offshore activities in 
frontier areas—like Shell’s decision to halt Arctic Ocean exploration “for 
the foreseeable future”3—create an opportunity to effectuate change. 
The Department of the Interior (DOI) can use this interval to better 
prepare for future leasing decisions and improve the overall 
management of the federal program. Interest in Arctic Ocean leasing 
and exploration, for example, has been cyclical.4 Proactive steps to 
address regulatory deficiencies should lead to better decisions, if and 
when interest reemerges. Meanwhile, there is likely to be continued 
demand for offshore leases in the Gulf of Mexico, and implementing 
these recommendations will help BOEM make smarter, more 
transparent, and more consistent decisions throughout its management 
of the OCS. The recent announcement by the Secretary of the Interior 
that DOI would pause all new coal leasing and comprehensively 
evaluate the federal coal program5 and the mounting public concern 
about the climate impacts from fossil fuel development reflect a 
recognition that the type of review we advocate is both possible and 
timely. 
This Article suggests a pragmatic path toward meaningful reform 
of BOEM’s planning, leasing, and exploration plan review processes. 
Part I provides necessary background and context for our argument, 
including the importance of effective regulations, changes that have 
already been made, and the need for further reform. In Part II, we 
describe our suggested regulatory reforms. We recommend both 
overarching changes that are broadly applicable to new regulations as 
well as specific reforms targeting five-year planning, lease sales, and 
permitting and authorization of exploration activities on the OCS. These 
recommendations call for greater transparency, more attention to 
environmental and social risks, and the use of modern economic tools, 
among other improvements. We conclude with recommendations for a 
path forward for DOI. 
 
 3.  Press Release, Shell Global, Shell Updates on Alaska Exploration (Sept. 
28, 2015).  
 4.  Michael LeVine, Peter Van Tuyn & Layla Hughes, Oil and Gas in 
America’s Arctic Ocean: Past Problems Counsel Precaution, 37 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 
1271, 1314–21 (2015) (noting the industry let most Arctic Ocean leases expire 
after a surge of leasing in the 1980s). 
 5.  Secretarial Order No. 3338, Discretionary Programmatic Environmental 
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I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
A.  Effective Regulations Are Important for Effective Agency 
Processes 
The primary function of agency regulations is to “implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”6 Lawmakers frequently craft 
statutes that are “so broadly phrased that agencies have enormous 
leeway to fill in the gaps—both procedural and substantive—of the 
legislation so long as they keep within the terms of the governing 
statutes.”7 In other words, Congress frequently gives administrative 
agencies extensive discretion to set policies and procedures.8 An 
agency’s power “to administer a congressionally created and funded 
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making 
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”9 When 
confronted with such a gap, federal agencies are empowered to 
“elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.”10 
Regulations must be consistent with the underlying statutory 
framework and Congress’s intentions.11 Truly effective regulations, 
however, go beyond that basic requirement. They are “consistent, 
sensible, and understandable”12 and “promote predictability and reduce 
uncertainty.”13 Agencies must strive “to promote such coordination, 
simplification, and harmonization” among multiple regulatory entities.14 
Moreover, existing regulations must be reviewed periodically to 
determine if they are “outmoded, ineffective, insufficient, or excessively 
burdensome.”15 As President Obama stated, federal agencies have a 
“mission to root out regulations that conflict, that are not worth the cost, 
or that are just plain dumb.”16 
 
 6.  5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012); Exec. Order No. 12,866, Sec. 3(d), 3 C.F.R. § 638 
(1993). 
 7.  WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (4th ed. 
2000). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974). 
 10.  Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 11.  See, e.g., id. at 843 (noting that both agencies and courts “must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress”). See also Exec. Order No. 
12,866, supra note 6, at § 2(a) (noting that agencies must ensure that “regulations 
are consistent with applicable law”). 
 12.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 6, at § 2(a).  
 13.  Exec. Order No. 13,563, Sec. 1(a), 3 C.F.R. § 215 (2012). 
 14.  Id. § 3. 
 15.  Id. § 6. 
 16.  Barack Obama, Commentary, Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2011). 
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Regulations that do not effectively fill the gaps left by Congress 
create the possibility of inconsistent agency decisions and increase the 
risk of litigation. Effective rules, on the other hand, streamline agency 
analyses, ensure good practices are carried forward, and help keep pace 
with innovation. 
B.  The Need to Reform Existing Rules 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)17 is the primary 
law governing management of oil and gas activities in federal waters. 
The statute is intended to enable “expeditious and orderly development 
[of OCS resources], subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner 
which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other 
national needs.”18 OCSLA creates a four-stage process for management 
of offshore oil and gas activities: (1) developing a Five-Year Leasing 
Program, (2) holding the lease sales scheduled in that Program, (3) 
evaluating and permitting exploration activities, and (4) evaluating and 
permitting development and production activities.19 At each of these 
stages, the statute provides some direction, but its mandates are broadly 
stated and afford the agency substantial discretion.20 
In many respects, OCSLA itself should be updated to reflect the 
changing industry and lessons learned in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon tragedy and Shell’s failed 2012 drilling season.21 Congress, 
however, has taken no action to amend the statute and is unlikely to do 
so in the current political environment. 
In contrast, DOI has made progress in advancing reforms using the 
authority and discretion afforded by the statute. Most notably, DOI 
disbanded the troubled Mineral Management Service (MMS) and 
replaced it with three independent successor agencies: BOEM, the 
Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office 
of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).22 This change was intended to 
 
 17.  43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56 (2012).  
 18.  Id. § 1332(3). 
 19.  Id. §§ 1337, 1340, 1344, 1345, 1351. See also LeVine, Hartsig & Clements, 
supra note 1, at 235–36 (explaining the four-stage process in detail). Additional 
information about this framework is also available at LeVine, Van Tuyn, & 
Hughes, supra note 4, at 1308–10.   
 20.  LeVine, Hartsig & Clements, supra note 1, at 254–55. 
 21.  See Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L. J. 269, 273 (2011). See also LeVine, Van Tuyn, & 
Hughes, supra note 4 (describing needed changes). 
 22.  HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41485, REORGANIZATION OF 
THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL 14 (2010). See also LeVine, Hartsig & Clements, supra note 1, at 
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improve DOI’s performance with respect to ensuring: (1) balanced and 
responsible development of energy resources on the OCS; (2) safe and 
environmentally responsible exploration and production and 
enforcement of applicable regulations; and (3) fair return to the taxpayer 
from offshore royalty and revenue collection and disbursement 
activities.23 
DOI has also made progress in modernizing some of its 
regulations. By and large, these changes have applied to the revenue 
collection functions of ONRR and to the safety and inspection functions 
of BSEE.24 
This progress has continued since publication of our earlier Article. 
In addition to the reforms described there, BOEM has increased the 
liability limits for offshore facilities to keep pace with inflation.25 This 
update, which went into effect in January 2015, was the first time the 
liability limits were changed since they were required in 1990 by the Oil 
Pollution Act.26 
In February 2015, BSEE and BOEM proposed a new safety and spill 
prevention rule applicable to exploration in the U.S. Arctic Ocean.27 
When finalized, this rule will codify important new requirements, like 
same-season relief well capability, production of an Integrated 
Operations Plan, and seasonal restrictions to account for ice cover.28 
While important, the new safety and prevention requirements do not 
address all of the risks in the Arctic and do not take advantage of other 
opportunities to improve safety and response.29 
In March 2016, BOEM released proposed new rules that would 
update the manner in which the agency regulates air emissions from 
offshore operations.30 The new rule is responsive to a provision in the 
 
251 (discussing the reform in detail). 
 23.  The Reorganization of the Former MMS, U.S. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY 
MGMT. [hereinafter BOEM], http://www.boem.gov/About-BOEM/ 
Reorganization/Reorganization.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). 
 24.  LeVine, Hartsig & Clements, supra note 1, at 251–53. 
 25.  Consumer Price Index Adjustments of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
Limit of Liability for Offshore Facilities, 79 Fed. Reg. 73,832, 73,832–33 (Dec. 12, 
2014). 
 26.  Id. See also Press Release, BOEM, BOEM Adjusts Limit of Liability for Oil 
Spills from Offshore Facilities (Dec. 11, 2014) (announcing the increase in 
liability limits). 
 27.  Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf—
Requirements for Exploratory Drilling on the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf, 80 
Fed. Reg. 9,916, 9,916–71 (proposed Feb. 24, 2015). 
 28.  Id. at 9, 924–26.  
 29.  Arctic Resources and American Competitiveness: Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 114th Cong. 10–
11 (June 16, 2015) (statement of Michael LeVine, Pacific Senior Counsel, Oceana).  
 30.  Air Quality Control, Reporting, and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,717 
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2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act in which Congress transferred 
the authority to regulate air pollution from activities on the OCS 
offshore of the North Slope Borough in Alaska from the Environmental 
Protection Agency to DOI.31 The new rule applies to activities in the Gulf 
of Mexico and Chukchi and Beaufort Sea planning areas. 
None of these regulatory changes address in any way BOEM’s 
obligations to prepare five-year leasing programs or hold lease sales; nor 
do they improve the manner in which BOEM evaluates and approves 
exploration plans.32 The regulations that govern these phases of the 
OCSLA process remain essentially unchanged from their initial 
promulgation more than three decades ago.33 They have not kept pace 
with changes in the industry. They fail to provide effective guidance, 
reflect new agency culture, incorporate updated analytical 
methodologies, or conform to modern policy priorities. 
There have been repeated calls for fundamental reform of DOI’s 
regulations. Both the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (National Commission) and Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) have urged reform of planning and 
leasing regulations.34 DOI has the authority to make changes that would 
substantially improve decision-making. Updates to BOEM’s regulations 
could: help address the disconnect between the old regulations and the 
new agency culture; remedy substantive problems that plague existing 
planning, leasing, and exploration processes; and more effectively 
implement new policy direction.35 In addition, new rules could have the 
salutary benefit of providing certainty to oil companies. Echoing similar 
statements from ConocoPhillips and Statoil, Shell placed some of the 
blame for its withdrawal from the Arctic Ocean on an uncertain 
regulatory environment.36 Clarifying the planning, leasing, and 
exploration plan approval processes could provide a measure of 
certainty. 
 
(proposed Mar. 17, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 550) (Fed. Reg. notice 
forthcoming), http://www.boem.gov/Air-Quality-Proposed-Rule/. 
 31.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 432(b), 125 
Stat. 1048–49 (2011).  
 32.  Arguably, the proposed Arctic regulations and air emission rule could 
affect the equipment companies are required to have and the standards for spill 
response and air emissions to which companies are held during exploration. 
They do not, however, reflect a comprehensive review of those regulations or 
address the more systemic deficiencies identified here. 
 33.  LeVine, Hartsig & Clements, supra note 1, at 237–38. 
 34.  Id. at 243–47. 
 35.  Id. at 254–58.  
 36.  See Press Release, Shell Global, supra note 3 (noting “the challenging and 
unpredictable federal regulatory environment in offshore Alaska”). 
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II. RECOMMENDED REGULATORY REFORMS 
There is both need and opportunity to update BOEM’s regulations. 
Here, we explain the nature of some of the changes that would help 
modernize these rules. Part A of this section suggests overarching 
reforms needed to address problems that occur throughout the OCSLA 
process. Parts B, C, and D recommend more specific reforms to the 
regulations that govern development of five-year OCS oil and gas 
leasing programs, sale of OCS leases to oil and gas companies, and 
review of exploration drilling proposals. 
For several reasons, we do not recommend specific language or 
address individual regulatory provisions that should be revisited. As 
was made clear in our earlier Article, the regulations governing 
planning, leasing, and permitting exploration are sufficiently inadequate 
so as to require fundamental change. Because the rules should be 
reconceived and rebuilt to implement OCSLA effectively, we focus on 
key themes that, if addressed properly, will improve the fundamental 
regulatory process and lead to better management outcomes. Specific 
regulatory language can be developed as the agency crafts new rules. 
A.  Overarching Reforms 
Some regulatory shortcomings affect all stages of the OCSLA 
process or reoccur in different ways throughout BOEM’s planning, 
leasing, and exploration regulations. Meaningful reform would address 
these overarching problems systemically at each phase of the process. 
1. Clarify and Improve the Use of National Environmental Policy Act 
Analyses in Management of the OCS 
 
Unlike other federal agencies, BOEM does not have its own 
guidance or regulations defining the way in which it fulfills its National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) obligations.37 The lack of specific 
guidance has contributed to calls from the National Commission, CEQ, 
and others for reform of the manner in which DOI addresses its NEPA 
 
 37.  See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING—REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 261 (2011) (noting that BOEM’s 
predecessor agencies never developed formal NEPA guidance) [hereinafter 
NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER]. In contrast, for example, the Bureau of Land 
Management and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have handbooks providing 
NEPA guidance. See generally BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT HANDBOOK H-1790-1 (2008); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV., NEPA FOR NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGES: A HANDBOOK (2014).  
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obligations with regard to OCS activities.38 In addition, BOEM’s 
compliance with NEPA has been the subject of a series of lawsuits that 
highlight the value of fundamental review.39 Addressing these problems 
through new regulations will help BOEM better comply with its NEPA 
obligations, make better use of public expertise and input, and reach 
more robust decisions. 
Effective regulations would clarify the way in which BOEM 
complies with NEPA requirements at each stage of the OCSLA process. 
As CEQ put it, BOEM should “[e]nsure that NEPA analyses fully inform 
and align with substantive decisions at all relevant decision points.”40 
The problematic manner in which BOEM has approached NEPA 
compliance is particularly evident with regard to Chukchi Sea Lease 
Sale 193. The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) underlying the 
decision to hold the sale was invalidated by the federal district court in 
Alaska on the grounds that the government failed to comply with a CEQ 
regulation addressing missing scientific information.41 On remand, the 
agency addressed that issue but did not fix a fundamental problem with 
the scenario it used to evaluate the potential impacts from development 
even though that problem had been identified in public comments on 
the original EIS and Supplemental EIS. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals then invalidated the Supplemental EIS.42 BOEM prepared a 
Second Supplemental EIS, and a subsequent Office of Inspector General 
Report identified a series of problems with the manner in which that 
analysis was prepared.43 That Second Supplemental EIS has also been 
 
 38.  See LeVine, Hartsig & Clements, supra note 1, at 245. DOI’s own 
Inspector General has identified problems with NEPA compliance and called for 
the agency to “[e]xplore and encourage other processes, policies, and incentives 
that promote a culture of balanced stewardship and evaluate existing policies 
and practices that may impede the ability to achieve this balance.” OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, A NEW HORIZON: LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 35 (Dec. 7, 2010), https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/ 
files/A-New-Horizon-Public.pdf. 
 39.  See, e.g., LeVine, Van Tuyn & Hughes, supra note 4, at 1328–30, 1342–43 
(describing NEPA-related litigation stemming from DOI’s sale of OCS lease 
tracts in the Chukchi Sea). 
 40.  COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY [CEQ], REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL 
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 4 (Aug. 16, 2010) [hereinafter CEQ, 
MMS NEPA POLICIES].  
 41.  Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1018 (D. 
Alaska 2010). 
 42.  Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Jewell, 740 F.3d 489, 505 (9th Cir. 2014).   
 43.  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INVESTIGATIVE 
REPORT OF MANAGEMENT INTERFERENCE WITH LEASE SALE 193 (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://www.doioig.gov/sites/doioig.gov/files/WebRedacted_MgmtInterfere
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challenged in court.44 
An important part of meeting NEPA obligations is ensuring that 
BOEM uses “tiering” appropriately and effectively. Tiering occurs when 
an agency relies on or incorporates analysis from a broader NEPA 
document in subsequent analyses.45 Proper use of tiering can help avoid 
repetition in NEPA documents that analyze different stages of the 
OCSLA process. Improper use of tiering, however, can result in 
insufficient analysis and review.46 In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, CEQ recommended that BOEM “reexamine its NEPA 
implementation policies to ensure that its use of tiering is both clear and 
well-defined, and is not being used to limit site-specific environmental 
analysis.”47 Similarly, the National Commission recommended that 
BOEM develop “guidelines for applying NEPA in a consistent, 
transparent, and appropriate manner to decisions affecting OCS oil and 
gas activities.”48 
Regulations could help define when preparation of a new or 
supplemental EIS is required. At the exploration stage, for example, 
significant new information about projected impacts would necessitate a 
supplemental EIS. This situation is especially likely to arise in frontier 
areas or when operators intend to use new technologies. Regulations 
should also make clear that exploration activities do not qualify for 
categorical exclusion from the NEPA process. 
To further this effort, BOEM can help define the rigorous 
cumulative impact analyses needed in an EIS to avoid the potential for 
geographic or temporal segmentation. These regulations could improve 
analyses by providing context-specific standards and methods to ensure 
that agency staff has the direction necessary to consistently produce 
high-quality cumulative impact analyses. Similarly, BOEM should 
require a full assessment of the effects of exploration and development 
in site-specific lease sale EISs before OCS leases are sold. Doing so 
would help fulfill NEPA’s purpose of “looking before you leap.”49 
 
nce_Lease193EIS.pdf.  
 44.  Plaintiffs’ Opening Brief at 1, Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell, 1:08-
cv-00004-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 28, 2015). 
 45.  CEQ, Memorandum on Effective Use of Programmatic NEPA Reviews 
7–9 (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 46.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 260 (noting that “[a]s 
applied by MMS . . . tiering was not always consistent with its original purpose: 
instead, it created a system where deeper environmental analysis at more 
geographically targeted and advanced planning stages did not always take 
place.”).  
 47.  CEQ, MMS NEPA POLICIES, supra note 40, at 23.  
 48.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 261. 
 49.  See, e.g., William J. Snape III, Joining the Convention on Biological Diversity: 
A Legal and Scientific Overview of Why the United States Must Wake Up, 10 
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New regulations would provide the opportunity to codify 
explicitly the requirement to analyze low-probability, high-risk events to 
help ensure that the agency and other stakeholders are prepared for a 
worst-case disaster. After the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, CEQ 
recommended that BOEM “take steps to incorporate catastrophic risk 
analysis going forward.”50 Likewise, the National Commission 
recommended that BOEM “incorporate the ‘worst-case scenario’ 
calculations from industry oil spill response plans into NEPA 
documents and other environmental analyses or reviews” to inform the 
agency’s “estimates for potential oil spill situations in its environmental 
analyses.”51 To its credit, BOEM incorporated a “very large oil spill” risk 
analysis in its supplemental EISs for Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193.52 New 
NEPA regulations would ensure that this type of risk is considered in all 
future OCS environmental analyses. 
Some of the other changes suggested below—for example, 
rethinking the manner in which BOEM interprets the thirty-day 
deadline for review of an exploration plan—would affect the manner in 
which BOEM fulfills its NEPA obligations.53 Addressing these issues 
through a comprehensive rulemaking would help provide consistency 
and clarity. 
2. Increase Transparency 
 
BOEM regulations can be revised to improve transparency and 
public participation in OCS decision-making processes. As President 
Obama stated on his first day in office, “[o]penness will strengthen our 
democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government.”54 
This principle is particularly important as public scrutiny of offshore oil 
and gas activities has grown in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
accident and Shell’s failed 2012 drilling season, and as the need to take 
action to address greenhouse gas emissions is increasingly recognized.55 
 
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 6, 10 (2010) (characterizing NEPA as “the epitome 
of a ‘look before you leap’ mandate”). 
 50.  CEQ, MMS NEPA POLICIES, supra note 40, at 27.   
 51.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 267.  
 52.  BOEM ALASKA OCS REGION, OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE 193 IN THE CHUKCHI 
SEA, ALASKA: FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT VOL. I, 
APPENDIX D (2011).  
 53.  See infra III.D.1. 
 54.  Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, 2009 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Jan. 21, 2009).    
 55.  Indeed, drilling for oil and gas in the Arctic Ocean became a campaign 
issue for some presidential candidates even in the early stages of the 2016 race. 
See, e.g., Alan Rappeport, Disagreeing with President, Hillary Clinton Says She 
Opposes Drilling in Arctic Ocean, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015). The issue also 
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Transparency with respect to management of OCS activities can help the 
American public be assured that it is receiving fair market value for any 
OCS energy production and that the risks of any oil spills or other 
negative externalities are being fairly evaluated and considered.56 
To implement the president’s commitment to open government, 
federal agencies were directed to take three important steps: publish 
information online; improve the quality of government information; and 
create and institutionalize a culture of open government.57 DOI has 
created and updated an Open Government Plan through which it has 
taken some important steps to further transparency related to OCS 
activities.58 Notably, the United States has spent more than three years 
working toward implementation of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), “a global standard that promotes revenue 
transparency and accountability in the extractive sector” by requiring 
“report[s] in which governments and companies publicly disclose 
royalties, rents, bonuses, taxes and other payments from oil, gas, and 
mineral resources.”59 DOI has gone beyond the requirements of EITI and 
is planning to publish all revenue data collected by the ONRR from 
extractive companies operating on federal lands.60 
In addition, DOI has participated in the creation of data.gov, which 
provides high quality data sets for public use,61 and the agency is 
working to revamp BSEE’s website to make it more user-friendly and 
accessible. With regard to exploration operations in the Arctic Ocean, 
BOEM allowed for public comments on the NEPA process related to 
 
prompted twelve U.S. Senators to send a letter urging President Obama not to 
authorize drilling in the Arctic Ocean. See Letter from Jeffrey Merkley, et al., 
United States Senators to Barack Obama, President of the United States (Sept. 25, 
2015), http://www.sanders.senate.gov/download/sanders-whitehouse-on- 
arctic-drilling-?inline=file.   
 56.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(4) (2012) (requiring that “[l]easing activities . . . be 
conducted to assure receipt of fair market value for the lands leased and the 
rights conveyed by the Federal Government.”). See also JAYNI FOLEY HEIN, INST. 
FOR POLICY INTEGRITY, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION: HOW 
MODERNIZING THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR’S FISCAL TERMS FOR OIL, GAS, AND 
COAL LEASES CAN ENSURE A FAIR RETURN TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 7 (June 2015) 
(discussing the fair market value requirement for offshore energy production) 
[hereinafter FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION].  
 57.  Peter R. Orszag, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies: Open Government Directive, M-10-06, 2–4 (Dec. 8, 2009). 
 58.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OPEN GOVERNMENT PLAN 3.0 (June 2014). 
 59.  DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVE FACT SHEET 1 (Feb. 2015).  
 60.  U.S. EXTRACTIVE INDUS. TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE, EITI ANNUAL ACTIVITY 
REPORT 2014 2, 7–8 (June 30, 2015), https://eiti.org/files/usa_2014_annual_ 
activity_report_aar.pdf. 
 61.  See generally About Data.gov, DATA.GOV, http://www.data.gov/ 
about#collected (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).  
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Shell’s exploration plan and approval of its oil spill response plan, and 
BSEE made public the letters denying requests for suspensions of 
operations on Chukchi and Beaufort Sea leases.62 There is no formal 
requirement for such comment periods, and BSEE has not made letters 
like these public in the past. 
Using the notice-and-comment rulemaking process to formalize 
practices that promote transparency and openness will help build trust, 
improve public participation in the decision-making process, and fulfill 
President Obama’s pledge to ensure openness in government.63 New 
regulations could require that federal regulators post on their websites—
in a proactive and timely fashion—all non-privileged information 
related to exploration activities, including permitting, inspections, 
monitoring, and enforcement. For example, regulations should require 
BOEM and BSEE to post on their websites proposed plans and plan 
revisions, requests for modification, approvals, and similar documents. 
In addition, BOEM and BSEE could be required to make available to the 
public information on monitoring and enforcement activities, as well as 
data concerning incidents and near-misses, including causal 
information. 
Transparency and public participation also would be improved by 
regulations designed to ensure that the public has an opportunity to 
review and provide feedback on all non-confidential aspects of 
exploration plans. While public notice and comment is already required 
in any EIS process, BOEM can ensure that all agency environmental 
assessments (EAs), including those related to the evaluation of OCS 
exploration plans, are available for public notice and comment. 
Addressing these issues systematically in BOEM’s planning, leasing, 
and exploration regulations would help ensure better decisions, 
 
 62.  Press Release, BOEM, BOEM Invites Public Comment to Inform 
Environmental Assessment and Analysis of Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan (Apr. 
10, 2015); BSEE, Letter of Response to Statoil Suspension of Operations Request 
(Oct. 16, 2015); BSEE, Letter of Response to Shell Suspension of Operations 
Request (Oct. 16, 2015). 
 63.  Organizations seeking information from DOI related to OCS activities 
have historically been required to submit requests pursuant to the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA). This process, though important, can be cumbersome for 
both the requestor and government agency. It has led to litigation and 
inefficiency. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, 
Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Mineral Mgm’t Serv., 1:08-cv-00936-BSJ-GWG 
(S.D.N.Y 2008) (alleging violations of the FOIA by the Minerals Management 
Service); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Alaska Wilderness 
League v. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgm’t, 1:13-cv-00586 (D.D.C. 2013) (alleging 
violations of the FOIA by the BOEM). Increasing publicly available information 
should not displace FOIA obligations, but it could eliminate the inefficiencies 
that result when the agency requires FOIA requests for non-privileged 
information that could simply be made available. 
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accountability, and public participation. 
3. Ensure Effective Incorporation of Traditional, Local, and Indigenous 
Knowledge 
 
Regulations governing OCS oil and gas activities do not explicitly 
ensure incorporation of traditional, local, and indigenous knowledge 
into the decision-making process. This deficiency is particularly 
significant in the U.S. Arctic, where Alaska Natives may have 
information about geographic areas or resources that is otherwise 
unavailable to agency decision-makers.64 In his Executive Order 
addressing coordination in the Arctic, President Obama specifically 
recognized that, as part of responsibly managing resources in the Arctic 
region, “we must rely on science-based decision-making and respect the 
value and utility of the traditional knowledge of Alaska Native 
peoples.”65 Similarly, the National Ocean Policy implementation plan 
calls on federal agencies to integrate “traditional ecological knowledge 
and scientific data collected by indigenous groups.”66 A federal 
interagency working group recommended improving “decision-makers’ 
access to integrated scientific information and traditional knowledge 
relevant to management in the Arctic.”67 While these policies represent 
progress, they are not codified in BOEM’s regulations. 
Promulgating regulations establishing a set of procedures to solicit 
and incorporate traditional knowledge will facilitate efficient flow of 
information between local and indigenous knowledge-holders and 
agency officials; improved regulations should also help ensure that 
federal agencies fully consider traditional knowledge in the decision-
making process. Collection of relevant information from local and 
indigenous knowledge-holders will also help ensure that local concerns 
are heard from the outset, which may avoid complications later in the 
process. Effective guidance and mechanisms for this participation have 
the potential to improve products, decisions, and community relations.68 
 
 64.  Henry P. Huntington, Using Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Science: 
Methods and Applications, 10 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 1270, 1270 (2000). 
 65.  Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,191 (Jan. 21, 2015). 
 66.  NAT’L OCEAN COUNCIL, NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
21 (Apr. 2013). 
 67.  INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT AND PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A 
RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 47 (Mar. 2013). 
 68.  See Huntington, supra note 64, at 1273 (concluding that traditional 
ecological knowledge “has made a demonstrable difference in many research 
projects and management strategies”). 
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4. Formalize and Codify Efforts to Improve Interagency Coordination 
 
BOEM regulations could formalize a strong interagency 
consultation process for OCS oil and gas decision-making. OCSLA 
specifically mandates that, “[i]n the enforcement of safety, 
environmental, and conservation laws and regulations, the Secretary 
shall cooperate with the relevant departments and agencies of the 
Federal Government and of the affected States.”69 However, the 
planning, leasing, and exploration plan approval regulations set out no 
specific mechanisms for such cooperation. 
The need for more effective coordination has been widely 
recognized. The National Commission recommended that the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) “and other federal 
agencies with appropriate expertise should be encouraged to act as 
cooperating agencies in NEPA reviews of offshore energy production 
activities, including exploration and development plans and drilling 
permit applications.”70 It also recommended that “[f]ederal agencies that 
submit comments to [BOEM] as part of a NEPA process should receive a 
written response indicating how the information was applied and if it 
was not included, why it was not included.”71 More recently, a review of 
Shell’s troubled 2012 offshore drilling program in Alaska recognized the 
importance of “close coordination among government agencies in the 
permitting and oversight process.”72 
Better rules defining processes for interagency coordination should 
lead to more informed decisions and may help avoid the appearance 
that input from expert agencies has not been effectively considered.73 
Some steps have been taken in this direction. For example, NOAA acted 
as a cooperating agency on a recent BOEM-led Programmatic EIS to 
assess geological and geophysical activities in the Mid and South 
Atlantic Ocean planning areas.74 More generally, NOAA and BOEM 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure that OCS decision-
 
 69.  43 U.S.C. § 1334(a). 
 70.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 265.  
 71.  Id.  
 72.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR: 
REVIEW OF SHELL’S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION PROGRAM 5 
(Mar. 8, 2013).  
 73.  Letter from James W. Balsiger, Acting Assistant Adm’r, NOAA, to James 
Kendall, Acting Reg’l Dir., BOEM (Feb. 28, 2011), https://alaskafisheries.noaa. 
gov/sites/default/files/chukchiseaoilgas.pdf.   
 74.  See BOEM, ATLANTIC OCS PROPOSED GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL 
ACTIVITIES MID-ATLANTIC AND SOUTH ATLANTIC PLANNING AREAS: FINAL 
PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 1–9 (2014) (noting that 
NOAA requested and was granted cooperating agency status). 
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making is science-based and fulfills both agencies’ stewardship and 
conservation mandates.75 More broadly still, President Obama 
established an interagency “National Ocean Council” to advance a 
“collaborative framework” for ocean and coastal stewardship and to 
“facilitate[ ] cohesive actions across the Federal Government.”76 
In the Arctic, President Obama has recognized the need for more 
effective agency cooperation and created “an Arctic Executive Steering 
Committee . . . which shall provide guidance to executive departments 
and agencies . . . and enhance coordination of Federal Arctic policies 
across agencies and offices, and, where applicable, with State, local, and 
Alaska Native tribal governments and similar Alaska Native 
organizations, academic and research institutions, and the private and 
nonprofit sectors.”77 In addition, in 2011, the President created the 
Interagency Working Group on Coordination of Domestic Energy 
Development and Permitting in Alaska, which was charged with 
coordinating “the efforts of Federal agencies responsible for overseeing 
the safe and responsible development of onshore and offshore energy 
resources and associated infrastructure in Alaska.”78 
BOEM can explicitly codify the manner in which it takes advantage 
of these and other mechanisms for coordination. Doing so would ensure 
that the coordination is implemented and continued through future 
administrations. In that way, the benefits of cooperation and 
coordination would become part of the long-term planning for the OCS. 
B.  Five-Year Program 
In the five-year planning process, BOEM determines which areas of 
the OCS will be available for oil and gas leasing, and it schedules lease 
sales during the relevant five-year period. The plan, therefore, is the 
initial, broadest-scale step at which the government decides whether 
large swaths of the ocean will be made available for leasing to 
companies. 
The regulations governing BOEM’s five-year OCS leasing program, 
however, largely mirror the relevant statutory directives. For example, 
OCSLA Section 18 requires the Secretary of the Interior to “invite and 
 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, Memorandum of 
Understanding on Coordination and Collaboration Regarding Outer Continental 
Shelf Energy Development and Environmental Stewardship (May 19, 2011), 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/pdfs/05232011_NOAA-
BOEMRE-MOU.pdf.  
 76.  Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, 43,024 (July 19, 2010). 
 77.  Exec. Order No. 13,689, 80 Fed. Reg. 4,189, 4,191 (Jan. 26, 2015).  
 78.  Exec. Order No. 13,580, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,989, 41,989 (July 15, 2011). 
ARTICLE 1 - HARTSIG, LEVINE, HEIN, & SCHWARTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  2:12 PM 
2016 NEXT STEPS TO REFORM OIL AND GAS LEASING 17 
consider suggestions” for the five-year program from a variety of 
entities; the implementing regulations merely restate that requirement, 
instructing the Secretary to “invite and consider suggestions” from the 
same entities.79 The five-year program regulations offer no substantive 
direction to agency staff or decision-makers and little guidance about 
how to best satisfy the broad statutory mandate to craft a schedule of oil 
and gas lease sales that will best meet national energy needs while 
balancing the potential for environmental damage, discovery of oil and 
gas, and adverse impacts on the coastal zone.80 It is, perhaps, no 
coincidence that the five-year leasing program process has been subject 
to significant controversy, and a substantial number of the programs 
promulgated by DOI have been challenged in court.81 Several of these 
challenges have been successful.82 BOEM has the discretion under 
existing law to revise the regulations governing the preparation of five-
year OCS oil and gas leasing programs so that they provide useful 
guidance. 
1. More Effective Description of the Factors to be Considered Under 
OCSLA Section 18(a)(2) 
 
OCSLA Section 18(a)(2) specifies that the “[t]iming and location of 
exploration, development, and production of oil and gas among the oil- 
and gas-bearing physiographic regions of the [O]uter Continental Shelf 
shall be based on a consideration of” nine enumerated factors.83 There is, 
however, no meaningful regulatory interpretation of the manner in 
which the agency should evaluate these factors. Some of the factors are 
considered quantitatively, others only qualitatively. More specific 
regulatory guidance would foster more consistent and transparent 
decisions and would help prevent uncertainty and controversy. 
For example, Section 18(a)(2)(B) requires consideration of “an 
equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks 
among the various regions.”84 BOEM seeks to meet this obligation using 
 
 79.  Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(1) (2012) with 30 C.F.R. § 556.16(a) (2012).  
 80.  43 U.S.C. § 1344(a). 
 81.  See, e.g., LeVine, Van Tuyn & Hughes, supra note 4, at 1315, 1317, 1323, 
1342 (describing legal challenges to five-year OCS leasing programs issued in 
1980, 1982, 1986, 2007, and 2012). See also U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, BOEM, 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022 
2-7, 2-8 (2016) (describing legal challenges) [hereinafter BOEM, PROPOSED 
PROGRAM 2017–2022].   
 82.  See, e.g., BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81, at 2-7 to 2-
8 (describing legal challenges).  
 83. § 1344(a)(2). 
 84.  Id. § 1344(a)(2)(B). 
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a net benefits calculation.85 However, the manner in which BOEM has 
undertaken this calculation has not always been transparent, which has 
resulted in allegations that the agency obscured the specific costs faced 
by individual regions and in legal challenges.86 Regulations could define 
the factors and data the agency will consider in its “equitable sharing” 
calculus, require transparent disclosure of the gross costs and benefits 
experienced by each individual region (as well as onshore regions) of 
various leasing or “no sale” options, and establish guidelines for the net 
benefits calculation that would draw on the best available scientific and 
economic information. 
Similarly, OCSLA Section 18(a)(2)(G) requires BOEM to consider 
“the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of 
different areas of the [O]uter Continental Shelf.”87 In developing the 
2007–2012 five-year program, BOEM relied entirely on one study of 
coastal areas to meet this obligation. This approach was eventually 
invalidated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.88 
Regulations that more explicitly define how to consider “relative 
environmental sensitivity and marine productivity” would help BOEM 
carry out its legal mandate more effectively. 
2. Better Direction for the Balancing Required Under OCSLA Section 
18(a)(3) 
 
OCSLA Section 18(a)(3) requires the Secretary to “select the timing 
and location of leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to 
obtain a proper balance between the potential for environmental 
damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential 
for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”89 The agency has interpreted 
this obligation as a balance among the nine factors enumerated in 
Section 18(a)(2). 
At present, there are no regulations to help BOEM find the right 
balance between the risk of harm to the environment and potential 
 
 85.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012–2017 116–19 (June 
2012) (explaining BOEM’s “benefit-cost analysis”) [hereinafter BOEM, PROPOSED 
FINAL PROGRAM 2012–2017]. See also BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra 
note 81, at 8-1 to 8-25 (explaining BOEM’s “equitable sharing considerations”). 
 86.  See, e.g., Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity, et al. v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
 87.  § 1344(a)(2)(G). 
 88.  See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 563 F.3d at 489 (requiring more complete 
analysis to identify most and least sensitive environmental areas). 
 89.  § 1344(a)(3). 
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benefits from the pursuit of oil and gas. As a result, when explaining its 
approach to balancing in the 2012–2017 five-year program, BOEM has 
resorted to quoting extensively from the D.C. Circuit’s opinions 
evaluating challenges to its earlier balancing efforts.90 Instead of reacting 
to court challenges, BOEM should promulgate its own regulations to 
provide guidance and standards that promote consistency and ensure 
compliance with the statute’s balancing mandate. 
At times, BOEM has balanced its Section 18(a) considerations 
through a cost-benefit analysis, an approach endorsed by the D.C. 
Circuit91 and arguably required by Executive Orders.92 At the same time, 
BOEM has also asserted that Section 18(a)(3) balancing cannot be 
reduced to a formula: 
[s]triking this balance based on a consideration of the principles 
and factors enumerated in section 18(a) is a matter of judgment 
for which no ready formula exists. Section 18 requires the 
consideration of a broad range of principles and factors rather 
than imposing an inflexible formula for making decisions.93 
Even if an “inflexible formula” is not appropriate, the critical 
balancing would nonetheless benefit from regulatory guidance. Effective 
regulations could require consideration of specific factors and the use of 
certain methods that would help decision-makers as they evaluate and 
balance the relevant information. For example, when considering the 
potential for environmental damage or adverse impacts on the coastal 
zone, regulations could require BOEM to consider factors including, but 
not limited to: 
• the degree to which scientists understand the marine 
ecosystem and its capacity to absorb impacts that could result 
from OCS development; 
• the presence or absence of unique or endemic species that 
could be affected by OCS oil and gas operations; 
• other stressors, beyond new oil and gas activity, that affect 
ecosystem functioning or resilience; and 
• the degree to which spill response operations could be 
 
 90.  BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM 2012–2017, supra note 85, at 191–93. 
 91.  State of Cal. By & Through Brown v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1317–18 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (finding it “reasonable to conclude that within the section’s proper 
balance there is some notion of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’”). 
 92.  Michael A. Livermore, Patience is an Economic Virtue: Real Options, 
Natural Resources, and Offshore Oil, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 627 (2013). 
 93.  Id. at 588. In the Proposed 2017–2022 Program, BOEM similarly states, 
“[OCSLA] does not specify what the balance should be or how the factors 
should be weighed to achieve that balance, leaving to the Secretary the 
discretion to reach a reasonable determination under the existing 
circumstances.” BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81, at 2–5. 
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precluded by adverse environmental or weather conditions. 
Regulatory interpretation of Section 18(a)(3) that requires consideration 
or use of particular factors or methods would help remove at least some 
of the uncertainty that has plagued past balancing efforts. 
3. Provide Direction on When and How to Account for Option Value in 
the Planning and Leasing Process 
 
Regulations should also mandate consideration of option value in 
the five-year planning process and describe how to conduct this 
analysis. In this setting, option value means the value of waiting for 
more information on energy prices and extraction risks before deciding 
whether or when to offer for lease the public’s energy resources to 
private companies.94 The concept’s most familiar application is in the 
financial markets, where investors calculate the value of options to wait 
for more information on stock prices before deciding whether to buy or 
sell shares.95 The same methodology can be applied to “environmental, 
social, and technological uncertainties.”96 
Option value is applicable to the decisions made at the five-year 
planning stage, as well as the lease sale stage (as described below). At 
the planning stage, BOEM can account for differences in environmental 
and social uncertainties among the OCS regions to allow for more 
effective regional comparisons.97 
In fact, BOEM’s failure to consider option value at the planning 
stage was one of the subjects of a challenge to the agency’s 2012–2017 
five-year program.98 In that case, the petitioner argued that OCSLA 
required BOEM to explicitly consider and quantify the option value of 
delaying leasing in specific regions of the OCS. The D.C. Circuit 
ultimately upheld the 2012–2017 program, finding that quantification 
techniques were “not yet so well established that [BOEM] was required 
to use them” in the planning process. However, the court recognized 
that there is “a tangible present economic benefit to delaying the 
decision to drill for fossil fuels to preserve the opportunity to see what 
new technologies develop and what new information comes to light.”99 
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling “strongly suggests that future advancements in 
option value research could compel the agency to better quantify the 
 
 94.  Livermore, supra note 92, at 627. 
 95.  FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56, at 13. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2)(G) (requiring consideration of relative 
sensitivity of different areas of the OCS). 
 98.  Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 99.  Id. 
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option value associated with its leasing practices, which could pay 
enormous dividends to the American people by prioritizing lower-risk 
leasing and securing more favorable financial terms.”100 
BOEM recognized the importance of a more robust discussion of 
option value in its most recent proposed five-year program. For the first 
time, the agency includes some qualitative discussion of option value.101 
However, it stopped short of a full quantitative analysis of the value of 
waiting for more information on oil prices and environmental costs 
before scheduling lease sales.102 
It is notable that BOEM adjusted its analysis to reflect the best 
available information and economic tools. The fact that the agency had 
to be challenged in court to do so, however, underscores the advantages 
that could be gained by crafting effective regulations that encourage or 
require the use of the best available analytical tools. 
4. Require Identification of Important Marine Areas and Adequate 
Baseline Scientific Information 
 
To ensure that decision-makers have a strong understanding of the 
ocean environments that may be affected by their choices, BOEM’s 
regulations should guarantee that certain information is available before 
are area  can be included in a five-year program. At the broadest level, 
the availability of specific baseline scientific information will ensure 
informed decision-making. For example, a quantitative understanding 
of the marine environment, including robust food web models and 
identified important ecological areas, will help more fully evaluate 
choices about the potential effects of oil and gas operations on the OCS. 
Regulations should specify that, unless and until such data is available 
for a given area of the OCS, that area should not be made available for 
leasing in a five-year program. 
In addition, at the five-year program stage, identification of 
important marine areas within each region, as well as measures 
necessary to preserve the integrity and function of those important 
areas, will help ensure good planning decisions. Important marine areas 
may include areas of high productivity or diversity; areas that are 
important for feeding, migration, or the lifecycle of species; areas of 
biogenic habitat, structure forming habitat, or habitat for endangered or 
threatened species; or areas important for subsistence purposes. If 
 
 100.  Comments from Jayni Foley Hein, et. al., Inst. for Pol’y Integrity at NYU 
School of Law, to BOEM (Mar. 30, 2015), http://policyintegrity.org/documents/ 
Comments_to_BOEM_2017-2022_Offshore_Program.pdf. 
 101.  BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81, at 10-2 to 10-13. 
 102.  Id. 
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necessary to preserve ecological integrity and functioning, regulations 
should require that important marine areas be excluded from the five-
year program. 
President Obama has recognized the value of this approach. In 
January 2015, he signed a Presidential Memorandum withdrawing from 
oil and gas leasing several important areas in the U.S. Arctic Ocean: 
Hanna Shoal, Barrow Canyon, a 25-mile buffer along the Chukchi coast, 
and two smaller subsistence-use areas in the Beaufort Sea.103 In issuing 
this memorandum, the President exercised his authority under OCSLA 
Section 12(a).104  
BOEM has built on this approach in the Proposed 2017-2022 
Program. The agency has identified a series of “Environmentally 
Important Areas,” in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.105 The agency has 
identified particular values of these areas and intends the evaluation in 
the program and accompanying EIS “to serve as a foundation to inform 
future analysis and related leasing decisions concerning these 
environmentally important areas.”106 Regulations specifically requiring 
protection of disproportionately important areas would continue this 
momentum and ensure that BOEM takes proactive steps during the five-
year planning process to protect such areas.107 
Once important areas are identified, they must also be protected. 
Regulations, therefore, should impose specific, stringent precautions 
that must be in place before the sale of any OCS leases that could be 
reasonably expected to impact important marine areas. These rules 
would help protect areas in which leasing is prohibited and ensure the 
ongoing health of areas where leasing is not prohibited but where 
specific ecosystem functions merit other forms of protection. For 
example, operators could be required to locate exploration and 
development activities within lease blocks so that they minimize the 
potential for sound and other impacts to important areas. Requirements 
like these would help BOEM better meet its balancing obligations and 
ensure authorized activities will not harm the health and functioning of 
the marine ecosystem. 
 
 103.  Memorandum on the Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States 
Outer Continental Shelf Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition, 2015 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 59 (Jan. 27, 2015).  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81, at 4-1, 11-1 to 11-3. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See, e.g., Stan Senner, et al., Comment Letter on 2017–2022 Proposed Oil 
and Gas Leasing Program and Environmental Impact Statement (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BOEM-2014-0096-14343. 
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5. Codify the “Targeted Approach” to OCS Leasing for Frontier Areas 
 
In its 2012–2017 program, BOEM introduced a “targeted approach” 
to OCS leasing in the U.S. Arctic Ocean.108 BOEM has continued that 
approach in the Proposed 2017–2022 Program.109 Instead of opening an 
entire program area to OCS leasing, BOEM’s targeted approach excludes 
areas of lower petroleum potential that have high environmental or 
ecological importance. BOEM can refine and codify this “targeted” 
approach to leasing in its five-year program regulations. 
The area-wide leasing approach that BOEM has followed since the 
1980s is not mandated by OCSLA or BOEM’s existing regulations. It is a 
relic of former Secretary of the Interior James Watt’s commitment to 
“lease one billion acres” offshore.110 The area-wide approach, in which 
tens of millions of acres may be offered in single lease sales, makes 
effective environmental analysis very difficult, may limit competition, 
and seems to serve a limited political purpose for many areas in which 
there appears to be little industry interest or capability. 
A targeted leasing approach has substantial benefits, and BOEM 
can take steps to codify it in regulation. Without a formal rulemaking, it 
is possible that future administrations would eliminate targeted leasing 
in the Arctic and continue area-wide leasing elsewhere. Exclusion of 
important marine areas to preserve ecological integrity and functioning, 
as described above, could be an important component of this approach. 
Currently, BOEM begins from the premise that an entire planning area 
will be included in the program and requires specific justification for 
removing areas. Regulations could reverse this premise and allow 
leasing only in areas in which potential benefits can be shown to 
outweigh risks. BOEM regulations could also consider placing an upper 
limit on the percentage of an OCS planning area that may be included in 
any one five-year leasing program. 
Limiting the geographic scope of lease sales—for example by 
codifying BOEM’s “targeted approach” to leasing—would have the 
additional benefit of fostering more meaningful environmental NEPA 
analysis at the lease sale stage. It may also increase competition among 
companies for individual lease blocks. 
 
 108.  BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL PROGRAM 2012–2017, supra note 85, at 5-6. 
 109.  BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81, at S-5. 
 110.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 63.  
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C.  Lease Sales 
The regulations that apply to the lease sale stage of the OCSLA 
process have significant shortcomings. Several of the changes 
highlighted above—including those related to codifying the targeted 
leasing approach, defining areas to be excluded from leasing, and 
improving NEPA compliance—would substantially improve the 
regulations at this stage of the process as well. In addition, BOEM could 
take additional steps to modernize its OCS leasing regulations. 
1. Require Consideration of Option Value in Setting Fiscal Terms for 
Lease Sales 
 
In addition to accounting for option value during the planning 
stage, BOEM should account for the value of the government’s option to 
wait to sell leases when setting minimum bids for lease tracts.111 In its 
proposed program for 2017–2022, BOEM discusses the possibility of 
raising minimum bids in lease sales to account for option value. BOEM 
notes that raising the minimum bid may increase buyer selectivity, 
elevating “the efficiency of the lease sale process.”112 BOEM’s five-year 
program also includes a “hurdle price analysis,” an economic method 
used to calculate the tipping point for particular investments. At the 
program development stage, BOEM uses the hurdle price to identify 
areas that show current economic promise, while deferring other timing, 
composition, and sale design decisions to the lease sale stage.113 For the 
first time, BOEM’s proposed program for 2017–2022 added an estimate 
of the known environmental and social costs into the hurdle price 
calculation and now considers both the private and social costs of 
exploration and development in determining the hurdle price.114  This is 
a positive step; however, BOEM’s application of the hurdle-price 
analysis fails to account for environmental and social cost uncertainty, 
which is also relevant to optimal timing and would help ensure a more 
fair return to the public.115 
 
 111.  Livermore, supra note 92, at 630.  
 112.  BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81 at 10-20. See also 
FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56, at 15 (discussing the 
need for BOEM to raise minimum bids). 
 113.  BOEM, PROPOSED PROGRAM 2017–2022, supra note 81 at 10-13. 
 114.  Id. at 10-12, 10-14.  
 115.  See FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56 at 15–17; 
Comments from Jayni Foley Hein et al., Inst. for Pol’y Integrity at NYU School of 
Law, to BOEM (Mar. 30, 2015), 
http://policyintegrity.org/documents/Comments_to_BOEM_2017-
2022_Offshore_Program.pdf (“BOEM can calculate a ‘social hurdle price’ by 
modifying the agency’s existing dynamic programming model to include 
ARTICLE 1 - HARTSIG, LEVINE, HEIN, & SCHWARTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  2:12 PM 
2016 NEXT STEPS TO REFORM OIL AND GAS LEASING 25 
 Promulgating regulations relating to economic analysis of OCS 
lease sales would clarify and modernize BOEM’s analytical methods and 
have significant benefits for the agency. Updating regulations to account 
for option value would likely increase revenue to the federal 
government, make lease sales more equitable, and allow BOEM to 
prevent potential litigation. 
2. Promulgate Rent and Royalty Provisions that Account for 
Externalities 
 
Oil and gas operations result in significant air, water, and noise 
pollution, among other impacts. In addition, these activities can 
contribute both directly and indirectly to climate change, through 
“upstream” emissions associated with oil and gas operations and 
through “downstream” emissions from the burning of fossil fuels.116 
Often, companies do not pay for the full cost of these impacts—also 
known as externalities, or shared costs borne by third parties—because 
these costs do “not rise to the level of actionable legal claims,”117 and 
other policy tools that could help internalize these costs, like a national 
carbon tax, are not currently in place. Cumulatively, however, these 
costs are significant and quantifiable.118 For example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies use the social cost 
of carbon to estimate the climate benefits of rulemakings.119 BOEM 
estimates that offshore leases under its 2012–2017 program could 
generate up to 148 million tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent 
emissions;120 the current social cost of carbon is about $40 per ton of 
greenhouse gases emitted in 2015.121 Cumulatively, accounting for these 
 
externalities associated with drilling and the corresponding uncertainty 
underlying them . . . .”).  
 116.  Jessica Goad & Matt Lee-Ashley, The Clogged Carbon Sink: U.S. Public 
Lands Are the Source of 4.5 Times More Carbon Pollution Than They Can Absorb, CTR. 
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/green/news/2013/12/05/80277/the-clogged-carbon-sink-u-s-public-
lands-are-the-source-of-4-5-times-more-carbon-pollution-than-they-can-absorb/. 
 117.  FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56, at 18. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, The Social Cost of Carbon (last updated Dec. 11, 
2015), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc. 
html. 
 120.   U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT. OUTER 




 121.  INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, 
TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT 
ARTICLE 1 - HARTSIG, LEVINE, HEIN, & SCHWARTZ (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  2:12 PM 
26 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [33:1 
costs could generate billions of dollars that would help offset climate 
damages. 
BOEM currently does not quantify or charge lessees for these costs. 
The agency, however, has authority to adjust its rent and royalty 
provisions to “account for impairment of recreational interests and 
environmental and social externalities.”122 OCSLA contains no specific 
limit on BOEM’s ability to charge rent,123 and the agency has not 
specified the manner in which it decides the rental rates for offshore 
leases. Similarly, OCSLA establishes a minimum royalty rate, but does 
not impose a ceiling on that rate.124 
Addressing externalities and more fairly capturing costs is one of 
the driving factors behind the recently announced review of the federal 
coal program. Coal royalty rates are also set by regulation, and there is a 
direct parallel to oil and gas rent and royalty rates, especially as both 
programs are managed by DOI. 
Clarifying the manner in which rental and royalty rates are 
established would help provide certainty and confidence that the public 
is receiving fair market value for its resources. In establishing more 
comprehensive rental and royalty rate regulations, BOEM could specify 
a methodology through which climate and other quantifiable 
externalities are paid by the lessee.125 
D.  Approval of OCS exploration plans. 
1.  Change the Approach to OCSLA’s Thirty-Day Timeline for 
Approval of Exploration Plans that have been “Deemed Submitted” 
 
OCSLA requires BOEM to approve or deny an exploration plan 
within thirty days of the date on which the exploration plan is “deemed 
submitted” by the agency.126 In the past, BOEM has followed a cramped 
interpretation of the statute’s 30-day deadline under which it has 
deferred NEPA analysis of exploration plans until after the agency has 
deemed the plan submitted. As a result, the agency has either rushed its 
effort to complete an EA in a short 30-day window127 or has skipped 
 
ANALYSIS at 3 (2013) (giving the central estimate of $38 per ton, in 2007 dollars, 
for emissions in the year 2015). 
 122.  FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56, at 19. 
 123.  See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(6) (allowing the Secretary full discretion to 
prescribe rental provisions at the time the lease is offered). 
 124.  See id. § 1337(a) (establishing minimum royalty rates); FOLEY HEIN, 
HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56, at 20–23.  
 125.  FOLEY HEIN, HARMONIZING PRESERVATION, supra note 56, at 20–23.   
 126.  43 U.S.C. § 1340(c). 
 127.  See, e.g., Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, BOEM 
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NEPA analysis altogether using categorical exclusions.128 BOEM’s 
interpretation of the statutory time limit precludes effective 
environmental analysis and opportunity for meaningful public 
comment. 
Under a more logical and careful approach, BOEM would complete 
appropriate NEPA analysis before it deems an exploration plan 
submitted.129 Doing so would allow the time necessary to prepare a new 
or supplemental EIS or an environmental assessment and would allow 
time to solicit, review, and incorporate thoughtful public comment. As 
the National Commission recommended, BOEM “should not consider 
exploration plans officially ‘submitted’ until all of the required content, 
necessary environmental reviews, and other analyses are complete and 
adequate to provide a sound basis for decision-making.”130 
2. Make Conditional Approvals Impossible 
 
OCSLA directs DOI to either approve or deny exploration plans. In 
interpreting that obligation, DOI has granted “conditional approvals” 
when exploration plans meet some of the requisite standards but are not 
yet complete. The conditional approvals state that the plan is approved 
subject to the company submitting additional information, passing tests, 
and/or receiving other government approvals.131 For example, in 2012, 
 
Invites Public Comment to Inform Environmental Assessment and Analysis of 
Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan (April 10, 2015) available at 
http://www.boem.gov/press04102015/ (noting BOEM “has 30 calendar days to 
analyze and evaluate” Shell’s 2015 exploration plan for the Chukchi Sea). 
 128.  See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 81–82 (describing 
categorical exclusion of exploration plans in the central and western Gulf of 
Mexico). 
 129.  See, e.g., Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815, 834 
(9th Cir. 2008) (noting that BOEM is required to undertake a complete 
environmental analysis under NEPA, and that the agency has flexibility to do so 
under OCSLA’s statutory scheme), overruled by Alaska Wilderness League v. 
Kempthorne, 559 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 130.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 262. In the wake of the 
Deepwater Horizon accident, the Obama administration pointed to the 30-day 
timeframe as a problem that needed to be addressed. See, e.g., Shashank Bengali, 
Obama orders firms to change drill plans that mimic BP’s, MCCLATCHY DC (June 2, 
2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/white-house/ 
article24584410.html. 
 131.  See, e.g., Letter from David Johnston, BOEM Alaska Regional Supervisor, 
to Susan Childs, Shell Alaska Venture Support Integrator, Manager (May 11, 
2015) (approving Shell 2015 exploration plan subject to certain conditions), 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions
/Alaska_Region/Leasing_and_Plans/Plans/2015-05-11-Shell-EP-Conditional-
Approval.pdf; Press Release, BOEM, BOEM Issues Conditional Approval for 
Shell 2012 Chukchi Sea Exploration Plan: All Proposed Activities Must Meet 
New Rigorous Safety and Environmental Standards (Dec. 16, 2011), http:// 
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BOEM conditionally approved Shell’s exploration plans for the Arctic 
Ocean before BSEE had approved Shell’s oil spill response plans—even 
though the spill response plan is a required component of the 
exploration plan.132 Similarly, in 2015, BOEM approved Shell’s Chukchi 
Sea exploration plan even though Shell had not yet submitted an 
approval of its Oil Spill Response Plan, had not received approval for its 
capping stack or containment system, and had not received needed 
approvals to harass marine mammals, among other deficiencies.133 
The momentum created pursuant to these conditional approvals 
may make it difficult or impossible for agency staff to change or cancel 
some or all of the proposed oil and gas operations. In addition, 
conditional approvals make it more difficult for BOEM and BSEE to 
ensure that a spill response plan is suitable for the scope of the proposed 
Exploration Plan. Ultimately, conditional approval undermines the 
integrity of the approval process, and BOEM should explicitly disallow 
this practice. 
3.  Make Oil Spill Response Plans Subject to Public Review and 
Comment 
 
Operators’ oil spill response plans should be made subject to public 
review and comment. “There is a heightened, broad public interest in oil 
spill response by academics, non-governmental organizations, local 
government, tribes, and other federal agencies working in the Arctic, 
particularly after the Deepwater Horizon spill and the mishaps of Shell’s 
2012 drilling season.”134 Many of these stakeholders have significant 
technical expertise, local knowledge of coastal conditions or weather 
patterns, and other information that would benefit agency review of 
spill plans. Regulations should ensure that stakeholders have an 
opportunity to share this knowledge so that BOEM, BSEE, and OCS 
operators can improve the effectiveness of their spill response plans.135 
 
www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2011/press12162011.aspx. 
 132.  BOEM, supra note 131; Press Release, BOEMRE, BOEMRE Issues 
Conditional Approval for Shell Exploration Plan for Beaufort Sea: All Proposed 
Activities Must Meet New Rigorous Safety and Environmental Standards (Aug. 
4, 2011), http://www.boem.gov/BOEM-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2011/ 
press0804a.aspx. 
 133.  David Johnston, supra note 131.  
 134.  Letter from Marilyn Heiman, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Director, U.S. 
Arctic Program to Janice Schneider, Dep’t of the Interior, Assistant Sec’y for 
Land and Minerals Mgmt. at 7 (May 27, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/ 
#!documentDetail;D=BSEE-2013-0011-1099. 
 135.  BSEE is responsible for review and approval of spill response plans. 
Because an approved plan is necessary prior to exploration and could be 
combined with it, we include the public review recommendation here. See U.S. 
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The National Commission recommended joint agency and public 
review of oil spill response plans, additionally stating that these plans 
should be made available to the public once they are approved.136 
Codifying this review will help ensure full and fair public participation. 
To the extent that revised regulations require an EIS or EA with public 
review and comment for all exploration plans, stakeholders could 
review and comment on oil spill response plans as part of the NEPA 
process. To ensure that the agency is responsive to suggestions for 
improvement, the regulations could also require BOEM and BSEE to 
respond to comments and explain whether suggestions were acted upon 
and the reasoning behind the agency decision. 
CONCLUSION AND PATH FORWARD 
DOI has made progress toward better governance of OCS oil and 
gas activities, including important regulatory reforms. To date, however, 
these reforms have not substantively addressed OCS five-year planning, 
lease sales, or BOEM’s process for reviewing and authorizing 
exploration activities. With respect to these phases of the OCSLA 
process, BOEM still relies on outdated regulations that have not kept 
pace with changes within the industry. These regulations do not reflect 
new priorities and policies that call for greater transparency, more 
attention to environmental and social risks, and the use of modern 
economic tools. Comprehensive reform is needed. 
DOI should not lose the momentum it has created by transitioning 
from MMS to BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR. As BOEM and BSEE finalize the 
first tranche of regulatory reforms, they should lay the groundwork for 
broader reform. The approach DOI has taken to evaluating the coal 
program through a programmatic EIS provides one possible model to 
guide reform.137 
Another approach would be for Interior to issue a broad Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) to solicit feedback and 
suggestions for all of its regulations governing OCS management. This is 
the approach that EPA took, for example, when considering how to best 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to the Clean Air Act 
 
DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., An Overview of the 
Assignment of Regulations Between the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (noting that BSEE 
retains authority for “all oil-spill related activities”), http://www.boem.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/ChartBSEEBOEMRegulatoryAuthorities.pdf.  
 136.  NAT’L COMM’N, DEEP WATER, supra note 37, at 266–67.  
 137.  See Secretarial Order No. 3338, supra note 5 (summarizing the DOI’s 
evaluation of the Federal Coal Program and its plans for modernizing it). 
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following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.138 The 
agency has since promulgated a series of targeted emissions controls.139 
Similarly, in 2015, BLM issued an ANPR to solicit feedback on federal oil 
and gas fiscal terms.140 In the same manner, BOEM could issue a broad 
ANPR covering all of BOEM’s regulations, including five-year planning, 
lease sales, and exploration plan approval. 
DOI could then consider a process that incrementally reforms 
portions of the regulations. This process would take time—each portion 
of the regulations could easily take a year or more to complete—but that 
is all the more reason to begin now. 
Announcing this type of comprehensive regulatory reform would 
send a strong signal to oil companies and to the public that DOI intends 
to keep moving forward with the transition from the old MMS and 
toward a new way of doing business on the OCS. 
 
 
 138.  See generally, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air 
Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (July 30, 2008). 
 139.  See Regulatory Initiatives, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-
initiatives.html (documenting current and forthcoming regulations on 
emissions). 
 140.  Oil and Gas Leasing: Royalty on Production, Rental Payments, 
Minimum Acceptable Bids, Bonding Requirements, and Civil Penalty 
Assessments, 80 Fed. Reg. 76 (proposed Apr. 21, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. 
pt. 3100), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-
2015-0002-0001. 
